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O artigo compara duas visões a respeito do desenvolvimento tecnológico 
nos países menos desenvolvidos (PMDs): os estudos de "dependência", 
que salientam as limitações de transferência internacional de tecnologia e 
capacidade tecnológica local, assim como os trabalhos de "aprendizagem 
incremental local", que enfatizam as conquistas dos PMDs. Após uma breve 
descrição de sua formação intelectual e de seu contexto institucional, são 
discutidas as semelhanças e diferenças do modo como tratam o desenvol-
vimento tecnológico em PMDs. Argumenta-se que apesar de complemen-
taridades substanciais, que contribuem para uma melhor compreensão do 
fenômeno, diferenças importantes permanecem, especialmente quanto às 
consequências do desenvolvimento tecnológico de PMDs para a industria-
lização e a divisão internacional do trabalho, concluindo que desconsiderar 
os fatores cíclicos induz as duas "escolas" a equívocos nesse aspecto. 
ABSTRACT
The article compares two contrasting views on technological development of 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs): the "dependence" studies, which stress 
the limitations of international technology transfer and indigenous techno-
*  I am grateful to Hubert Schmitz and José Tavares de Araujo Jr. for their comments on a first 
draft of this paper. Of course they are not responsible for its contents.
**  Note of the organizers: this paper was originally written in 1983. We thank José Eduardo 
Cassiolato for the suggestion to publish it in this book.
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logical capability and the "incremental indigenous learning" works, which 
emphasize the achievements of LDCs. After a brief description of their intel-
lectual background and institutional setting, the similarities and differences 
of their treatment of technological development in LDCs are discussed. It is 
argued that despite substantial complementarities, which contribute to a 
better understanding of the phenomenon, important differences remain, 
especially as regards the consequences of LDCs technological development 
for industrialization and the international division of labor, concluding that 
the disregard of cyclical factors mislead the two "schools" in this respect. 
INTRODUCTION
Over the last fifteen years a considerable body of research on the technologi-
cal development of LDCs has come to light. The ideas of what can be loosely 
called the "school of dependence" had an important influence on shaping 
some of the questions posed by this research and the answers it provided. 
More recently the theses of technological dependence have come under se-
vere criticism [Soete (1981)] and, at the same time, a spate of new articles and 
books [e.g. Katz (1978); Lall (1982a; 1982b); Dahlman and Westphal (1982)] 
have suggested what seems to be an alternative view of the technological de-
velopment of the LDCs. The purpose of this article is to reassess the two views 
and draw out implications for the present industrialization debate. 
We begin with a brief presentation of what, in our reading, are the 
main characteristics of the two bodies of literature, including the intel-
lectual interlocutors and the institutional setting of elaboration of such 
theories, since both have a bearing here, as in any social science produc-
tion. Then, in the two following sections, we analyze in more depth the 
similarities and the differences between them as regards the technological 
efforts of LDCs and their implications for government policies and for the 
international division of labor.
421
Technological dependence and learning revisited
Fabio Stefano Erber
THE BACKGROUND OF THE TWO "SCHOOLS"
Technological dependence
It is beyond the purpose of this article to try to review the many contribu-
tions (often contradictory), which make up what has been called the "de-
pendence school,"1 but it is important to recall the main issues at stake. 
To begin with, it is important to note that dependence theories were ar-
guing against the "stages of development" theories (with their functional 
sociology underpinning and their emphasis on the "modernizing" role of 
foreign investment), which promised industrialization would come to the 
periphery as a "natural" result, similar to the industrialization of the "ear-
ly comers." At the same time, they went against the orthodox Marxist 
view that imperialism was opposed to industrialization of the periphery, 
although they sought their own theoretical roots in the Marxist paradigm. 
A third interlocutor of dependence theorists, with which they held a much 
more complex relationship,2 were the ideas developed by Economic Com-
mission for Latin America (ECLA) on defense of the industrialization of 
Latin America during the fifties and early sixties. ECLA argued that prod-
ucts led to an uneven development of the world system (with the prima-
ry production economies) and to an uneven internal development of the 
Latin American countries, incapable of solving their problems of capital 
accumulation and employment. By the time dependence theory came to 
1 For analyses in English, the reader may refer to Cardoso (1977a); Bienefeld (1980); Rodriguez 
(1980) and Seers (1981).
2 !is applies mainly to the Latin-American authors, since Frank (1969) was deeply opposed to 
ECLA’s theories, which he considered “bourgeois” and “reformist.” !e "lial relationship of 
some dependence authors, such as Cardoso, towards ECLA can be seen in his article (1977b) 
where he appraises ECLAS’, contributions. Precisely such heritage was criticized by more re-
cent studies of development of capitalism in Brazil, such as Cardoso de Mello (1982), which 
argue that the main shortcoming of dependence theory was its inability to free its analysis 
of ECLA’s approach to history in terms of the relationship of the Latin-American countries, 
overlooking thus the endogenous elements in capital accumulation and in the development of 
capitalist social relations.
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be developed, the warnings of ECLA3 that also spontaneous import-sub-
stituting industrialization would not be the answer to the problems of 
the Latin-American economies had been vindicated. In fact, dependence 
theory can be viewed as an afterthought of the battle for industrialization, 
which, by the mid-sixties, had come to seem more and more a Pyrrhic vic-
tory, in terms of internal economic, social and political equality and regards 
independence from external determination.
Dependence theorists asked two main questions, implicitly or explicitly: 
"Is capitalist development feasible in the periphery?" and "Which is its 
specificity vis-à-vis the pattern of development of central countries?"
Although there was agreement among the authors of the "depen-
dence school" about the specificity of the development of the peripheral 
countries, when compared to the central economies, there was sharp dis-
agreement about the growth possibilities of the former economies. Some 
authors [e.g. Frank (1969)] argued that such economies had a built-in 
tendency to the "development of underdevelopment," while others [e.g. 
Cardoso and Faletto (1979)] argued that, in some countries, the pattern 
of "associated development" offered scope for continuing the process of 
capital accumulation, albeit at a very high social and political cost.
The analyses of pattern of development which emerged from the 
phase of import – substituting industrialization argued that import of tech-
nology constituted now one of the main links of the chain of relationship 
which kept the economy of the Latin-American countries subordinated to 
advanced economies. The importance of technological link was greater for 
those countries which had industrialized more (e.g. Brazil, Mexico), and 
together with imports of capital goods, foreign finance and the industrial 
3 For a, now, classical study, see Tavares (1964). For a detailed presentation, of ECLA’s theories 
and their criticisms, see Rodriguez (1981).
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role of multinational corporations (MNCs), composed the web of the 
"new pattern of dependence."
In an early formulation [Cardoso (1973)], the underdevelopment of local 
capital goods industry and reliance on imported technology was seen as 
limiting the process of capitalist development of the periphery, since the De-
partment I of such economies (the sector producing means of production) 
was said to be virtually non-existent there, preventing a productive comple-
mentarity required by capital accumulation and draining the dynamic stimuli 
to the central economies. Further research showed this to be an over-simpli-
fication: in many countries, an internal technical capability and the produc-
tion of capital goods developed with the process of industrialization.
Nevertheless, the question posed by original dependence argument – 
the specificity of the industrial development of the periphery – and the 
answer provided – the difference in the industrial structure, especially the 
limited size and role played by the local supply of technology and means 
of production, remained nor only valid but influenced the considerable 
research on technological development performed by Government and 
academic substitutions. It is in this sense that we include this research in 
the "dependence school."
In trying to highlight the main concerns of these latter studies, we shall 
rely mainly on the results of the Brazilian research for several reasons. One, 
obviously, is convenience, but more important are features of the Brazilian 
economy: Brazil is one of the most industrialized of the LDCs, combining 
a large internal market with an aggressive export policy. Its capital goods 
industry is the largest among the LDCs (China excluded) and it is also 
one of the main LDCs in terms of investment in higher education, science 
and technological development. Nonetheless, there is a consensus that 
such investment so far has not seriously dented the industry’s reliance on 
imported technology. Finally, since the early seventies, an extensive body 
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of literature on technological development and science and technology 
policy developed in Brazil.4
Some of the issues dealt with in this literature are closely related to our 
present discussion:
• The sources of technology used by private (foreign and local) and State 
enterprises: local  – intra and extramural  – development (especially the 
use of universities and research institutes) and import of technology. 
Such research involved not only opening up the "black box" of tech-
nology so as to understand what capabilities were, or not, locally de-
veloped and absorbed but also the rationale of the use of such sources 
by the enterprises. Such studies were usually conducted at the sector 
level, and were complemented by studies of the "scientific and tech-
nological system," especially case studies of the research institute and 
their relationship to the enterprises.
• The study of the role of the State. Initially motivated by the analysis 
of the enterprises rationale and the role of State policies in such ra-
tionale, it then developed into an analysis of the relationship between 
the explicit science and technology policy and the more general in-
dustrial policies, and to the study of conflicts of interest within the 
State and their relationship to the general pattern of development of 
the country.
• The implications of technological dependence in terms of foreign ex-
change costs, of the pattern of competition within industrial sectors 
and the foreign dominance of such sectors, among others.
4 At the end of 1978, an extensive but not exhaustive survey made by the author listed over 
a hundred titles. See Erber (1981) for English-written translation. Of course, only part of 
such studies was directed to the issues of technological dependence. For a different source of 
inspiration see, for instance, the studies of diffusion by Araujo Jr. et al. (1976) and Cruz and 
Barros (1978).
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Studies in other Latin-American countries developed along similar 
lines, developing a substantial body of knowledge about technological 
development of the region. It is thus somewhat perplexing to find authors 
(from outside the dependence school) saying that the literature 
concerned with the transfer of technology has treated developing countries as 
passive recipients of technology from the advanced countries and concentrated 
on the imperfections of the technology market that raises the costs of buying 
technology to hapless developing countries [Lall (1982a, p. 6)].
Although inspired by the issues of dependence, such analyses drifted away 
from the Marxist moorings of the original writers of dependence into the 
safer waters of mainstream economics. To some extent, the movement was 
a consequence of the inadequacies of Marxist theory, especially as regards 
enterprise behavior in an oligopolistic system. However, the institutional influ-
ence cannot be discarded, since a considerable part of such studies was either 
commissioned or directly conducted by Government institutions, where Marx-
ist vocabulary and categories would be rather unwelcome (to put it mildly). 
In fact, during the seventies, in several countries of Latin America 
[Segasti (1978)], science and technology policy gained a new status. New gov-
ernment institutions were established and old ones modernized, to promote 
local scientific and technological development, adopting measures which of-
ten went against the grain of the more general policies of the government. 
Although the issues of internal domination and class conflicts posed by the 
original dependence literature were outside the pail in such institutions, an-
other part of the issues of dependence – the relationship between foreign and 
local capitals – was not. In fact, such research provided them with ammunition 
for justifying their existence and growth, and, at the same time, they gave the 
research a sometimes fruitful action-directs push. Nonetheless, this literature 
retained a "political economy approach," especially in the studies related to 
the State influence on technological development.
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The "Incremental Indigenous Learning (IIL) School"
The writings of this group of authors are well known to the English-speak-
ing readers, so we may be excused if we proceed at a greater speed. What 
probably are their most distinguishing traits are: (i) their view of techni-
cal change as an incremental process, and opposed to what Lall calls the 
"Schumpeter syndrome" (the emphasis on discontinuity and technologi-
cal breakthroughs, based on research and development); (ii) they present 
a rich body of evidence concerning the LDCs mastery of manufacturing 
technology and the capability of introducing adaptations in products and 
processes developed abroad, based upon incremental, learning process; 
and (iii) they argue that such learning underlies the successes of some 
LDCs in exporting technology, sometimes disembodied, but, most often, 
embodied in relatively complex products and services and even in turnkey 
plants. From this latter evidence, they suggest that a new international 
division of labor may be emerging with the economies which have de-
veloped such technical capability finding a new relationship to the others 
LDCs and to the older industrialized countries, based upon their techno-
logical capability.
The evidence upon which such theories rest consists mainly of a collec-
tion of detailed case studies of enterprises carried out in several countries 
in Latin America, especially in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, summarized 
in Katz (1978), and the studies of exports of technology by Latin-American 
countries [Katz and Ablin (1978)], India [Lall (1982a)] and Korea [Westphal 
et al. (1980); Dahlman and Westphal (1982)]. Such research was usually 
sponsored by international institutions, notably the World Bank, the In-
ter-American Development Bank (IDB) and ECLA.5 
5 Such literature is extensively reviewed in Bell (1982) from the point of view of the “infant 
industry” argument. Bell presents also many cases where learning did not occur, drawn mainly 
from Asian and African countries of recent industrialization.
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Although Marx was a keen observer of the phenomena of learning and 
stressed their importance for industrial development,6 the parentage and 
the interlocutors of the "IIL School" are predominantly neo-classical. This 
can be more clearly observed in the surveys they make of the literature [Katz 
(1978); Lall (1981, 1982a and b); Dahlman and Westphal (1982)] – e.g. 
the emphasis they put on the literature on "choice of technology." What 
is somewhat surprising is the ignorance they display of the contemporary 
literature on dependence, which had already shown in considerable detail 
the existence of local technological development in LDCs (a point developed 
further below). Whether this can be attributed to language barriers, to a 
paradigmatic parochialism or to other reason, is a moot question. It is cer-
tainly unfortunate, since this literature strengthens a part of their argument, 
even if it reduces some of its novelty. Moreover, it deprives the IIL literature 
of relevant interlocutors, which may contribute to question and to enrich 
their own conclusions, a purpose to which this article is but a modest step.
LOCAL TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN LDCS
As mentioned above, the IIL School emphasizes the development of a tech-
nological capability in LDCs through an incremental process, described by 
Dahlman and Westphal (1982, p. 126) as follows: 
Firms in developing countries acquire increased technological mastery by en-
gaging in a purposive technological effort to assimilate and adapt technology, 
an effort which typically takes place in relation to experience gained in produc-
tion engineering and project execution.7
6 See e.g. these chapters on the transition from manufacture to modern industry in vol. I of 
Capital and on the economies of constant capital in vol. III. 
7 “Production engineering [...] relates to the operation of existing plants. Project execution 
[...] pertains to the establishment of new production capacity” [Dahlman and Westphal (1982, 
p. 106-107)].
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This conclusion is fully consistent with the findings of the "depen-
dence" literature. In fact, from the earliest studies [e.g. Biato et al. (1971), 
for Brazil], it had been shown that local firms had developed design (basic 
and detailed) and manufacturing capabilities, especially for simple prod-
ucts, such as universal machine tools and agricultural equipment, based 
mainly on "reverse engineering."
The research on sectors where this mastery had been developed [e.g. 
Erber et al. (1974), for the capital good industry] showed that the local 
firms there tended to rely progressively more on imported technology via 
licensing, in the measure in which they diversified and increased the tech-
nical complexity of their production; a behavior confirmed by more recent 
studies [e.g. Erber (1982), for the same sector]. Although non-technical 
factors played an important role (e.g. preference of customers for for-
eign technology), the studies left no doubt there was also a discontinu-
ity in technical capabilities behind such shift in sources of technology. In 
new industries, foreign technology was often used from the outset, either 
via licensing or foreign investment [sometimes as a joint venture, as de-
scribed for petrochemicals by Araujo Jr. and Dick (1974); Silva Filho (1978); 
Teixeira (1982)]. In such cases a local technical capability was clearly lack-
ing, especially where continuous flow processes were involved, requiring 
a complex set of capabilities, from the basic engineering of the process 
and the basic design of the plant, to the specification and procurement of 
capital goods.
Nonetheless, the dependence literature has shown that the import of 
technology does entail the development of a local technological capabil-
ity – in fact, it argues that such capability is inherent in the dependent 
relationship. On the other hand, it also shows that such learning is limited, 
so as to preserve the dependent relationship. This should be no cause of 
surprise if one considers the rationale of the exporter of technology. Let us 
take the example of a licensor of technology of a product.
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Exporters of technology have a deep-seated interest in ensuring that 
their customers possess some technological capability, since their earnings 
are usually pegged to the latter sales and because the responsibilities of li-
censor and licensee are very difficult to apportion in cases of failure, break-
ages etc., which may jeopardize the licensor’s international reputation. 
Thus, the importer of technology must be at least able to manufacture the 
goods and/or operate the processes according to the specification, failing 
which the licensor must teach the licensee how to do it.
Moreover, in order that a product can be manufactured, all its parts 
and components must be specified to minute detail, and such specification 
must conform to the available supply of materials, parts and components, 
as well as to the specific production conditions of the local manufacturer. 
Therefore, the stage of detailed design8 is better performed locally, where 
the product is to be manufactured, than abroad, where the licensor is 
8 The design of a product goes through three main stages [Asimow (1962)]. Taking a machine as 
an example, we have:
i. Feasibility – e design process starts from a need recognition. Such needs are then con-
verted into the essential functions the equipment must perform and the latter expressed 
by specic performance requirements (e.g. capacity of containment and support). If, by 
confronting the resources available to the rm with such requirements and other constraints 
(e.g. delivery time), the enterprise decides that the equipment is feasible, it may end up with 
a set of feasible design concepts from which one will be chosen in the next stage.
ii. Basic design – Sometimes called “preliminary design,” this is, technically, the most import-
ant stage in the design process, since it involves not only the choices of the design concept to 
be implemented, but also the specication of the denition of the materials, sub-assemblies 
and components to be used in its manufacture. e main elements which determine the 
competitive possibilities of a machine (technical performance cost and delivery time) are 
dened at this stage.
iii. Detailed design – Here the main consideration is to provide information for production as 
each part is drawn in detail to be manufactured, with emphasis being placed upon dimen-
sions and tolerances.
 The relative importance of the three stages of design will depend on largely the novelty of the 
product for the enterprise. When the product is well known to the enterprises, the emphasis 
is on optimization of the characteristics of the product at the preliminary design stage, the 
importance of feasibility increasing with the novelty of the product.
 In terms of the categories of R&D, more often used in the literature on innovation, according 
to international definitions (e.g. the Frascatti Manual of the OECD), the feasibility and basic 
design stages should be included in “development,” as long as the design is for a new product, 
but detailed design should be excluded. For a fuller analysis of the design stages and technical 
references, see Erber (1977). 
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located. For all parties, then, it is desirable that the licensee should know 
how to produce detailed designs.
Although manufacturing know-how and detailed design skills are a nec-
essary condition for introducing innovations (as well as for production), they 
are not sufficient for purposes of innovation: basic design skills are necessary 
for innovation. Moreover, the mastery of the first two skills does not lead 
necessarily to a basic design capability: although in some products, espe-
cially mechanical products, it is often possible to progress from one to the 
other; in others, notably in products which perform atomic or molecular 
transformation, there is a discontinuity of knowledge between basic design 
on the one hand and detailed and manufacturing technology on the other.
Since basic design skills are not necessary for producing the goods, the 
exports of technology have no interest in closing such gap; quite the con-
trary, the teaching of such skills could foreclose a future source of revenues 
and even nurture a future competitor, especially in sectors (like the capital 
goods) where technical progress is incremental and engineering-based. 
The same applies to the skills for the feasibility stage of design. For sectors 
where innovation is not only design – intensive but also science-based, 
such as electronics, the transfer of technology is much more limited. The 
same reasoning applies to the licensing of process.
Thus, licensing does provide for learning but it is partial learning – a 
type of learning which, at the same time, ensures the licensor’s revenues 
and the continuation of the relationship over time. Such technical con-
trol in strengthened by legal provisions: as it is well known, technology is 
not sold, but leased – the owner of the technology does not forsake the 
property of the technology, only allows the licensee to use it for a limited 
duration of time, under certain conditions, some of which may by quite 
restrictive (export prohibitions, tied-in imports etc.). Such legal control ap-
plies even in the absence of patents, although the latter strengthens it.
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The same pattern of limited learning (or permanence of dependence) 
was observed in the case of foreign subsidiaries, where the patent com-
pany had to transfer a manufacturing and detailed design capability but 
not the others. The Latin-American literature suggests that this strategy 
was not only due to scale-economies in the production of technology, but 
also to the extraordinary profits they reaped through "technology-related" 
intra-firm transactions [Vaitsos (1974); Fajnzylber and Tarragó (1976)].
Thus, the literature on dependence argued that the transfer of tech-
nology between center and periphery was structurally limited on the side 
of the supplier of technology. Moreover, it was structurally limited on the 
side of the importer too. In fact, one of the main questions posed by this 
literature9 was: since the local entrepreneurs were aware of such limita-
tions (as shown by the research) and of the costs they entailed (tied-in 
imports, export prohibitions, threats of being ousted from the market by 
a subsidiary after the licensee had tested market, or having to pay for the 
technology in equity; at least, relinquishing the control of some important 
decisions), why did they not invest more in their own technology, walking, 
so to speak, "on two legs"?
The answer showed that many factors were at work, among which, six 
ranked especially high:
• The competition of foreign technology, which, being easily imported, 
put a high risk on attempting to develop local technology, especially 
where lead times were longer and costs higher, as for R&D-derived 
capabilities. Government policies related to foreign investment, im-
ports of capital goods (where project financing played a crucial role) 
and import of disembodied technology were important determinants 
of such competition.
9 See Erber (1981) for references.
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• The pressure of clients, which often made the use of imported technology 
a conditio sine qua non, barring thus the possibility of developing local 
technology. This was observed not only for consumer but also for capital 
goods and engineering services, inclusive for State enterprises purchases.
• The structures of the markets where such enterprises operated, which 
not only placed a premium on the monopoly, but also allowed them to 
pass on to the customers the cost of the technology imported.
• The size of the local market, relative to the expenditures necessary to 
develop local technology and the lack of protection of such technology.
• The short-term horizon with which local enterprises operated, in many 
cases due to the lack of planning by the State.
• The political outlook of local entrepreneurs, who were more afraid of 
being controlled by the State than by foreign firms.
Thus, at one level of analysis, the answer was that the dynamics of eco-
nomic and political forces was such that there was no incentive to the local 
entrepreneurs (and even less to subsidiaries of foreign firms) to develop a 
technological capability beyond that provided by technological transfer. This 
conclusion could be used to justify State intervention to foster such further 
development – and it often was. However, at another level of analysis, it 
showed that the original definition of dependence as a structural characteris-
tic of the peripheral economy was not incorrect – technological dependence 
was just a facet of a specific type of capitalist development. The peripheral 
development, if in some cases allowed for an expanded capital accumulation, 
nonetheless contained such accumulation in a relationship of subordination.
The conclusion that technological dependence is just part of a spe-
cific pattern of development is also important to avoid some pitfalls 
of technological determinism – it is not simply by changing the degree of 
technological self-reliance that this pattern of development will be radically 
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transformed – a "naïve optimistic" approach [borrowing the apt expres-
sion from Cooper (1973)] often found in the literature. The determinants 
of technological dependence have to be sought nor only at the level of the 
lack of technical and scientific skills in LDCs (although they may be a pow-
erful constraint in some cases), but especially at the level of the economic 
and political considerations which guide the action of the enterprises and 
of the State as regard the development of local technical capabilities. This 
view also lead to a reassessment of the role explicit science and technology 
policies may have in changing the technological dependence. When 
such policies not converge with the other policies (e.g. policies related to 
foreign investment) their efficacy is severely limited since they, alone, cannot 
change the pressures and inducements (some of which were mentioned 
above) which lead the enterprises to rely mainly on imported technology.
It is worth stressing that neither the more general interpretations of de-
pendence nor the more policy-oriented research argued against import of 
technology and in favor of autarky, either at the level of the sector (or firm) 
or at the macro level, as it seems to be implied by some recent appraisals 
of technological dependence, e.g. Soete (1981). Their main concern was 
with the balance between imported and local technology in a dynamic 
setting, which, they argued, led to a structural unbalance.10 
10 Therefore, if one wished to use data of international payments for technology to “test” the rela-
tionship between technological dependence and growth, one should look at the ratio of imports 
to local expenditures on technology, instead of the ratio of imports to exports, as Soete (1981) 
does. A study of the former ratio would show that even those developed countries which have a 
deficit in their technological balance of payment spend internally much more than they import, 
where as the peripheral countries not only spend less (in absolute terms and as ratio of GNP) 
for internal development of technology but also show a much smaller ratio of imports to local 
expenditures. Japan, for instance, which has huge deficit in her technological balance of payment, 
spends internally six times as much as it imports, while in Brazil (one of the LDCs which spends 
more in science and technology internally while restricting payments abroad for technology) the 
ratio was about two. Although such data are illustrative of technological gap between central and 
peripheral countries, given the basis upon which such additional expenditures are made, they fail 
completely to capture the relationship between local and imported technology outlined above. 
For a more general criticism of this type of “testing” of dependence theory, see Cardoso’s article 
on the “consumption” of such theory in the U.S. [Cardoso (1977a)]. 
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There are substantial similarities but also some important differences 
between the dependence literature and IIL studies, as regards the study of 
technological effort in LDCs.
Both have followed the same analytical steps: opening up the "black box" 
of technology and looking at the determinants of firm behavior as regards 
the different types of capabilities which lay in the box. Both agree that there 
is a discontinuity in the skills required to master such technologies. Moreover, 
both agree that although there is some complementarity between imported 
and local technology, the former may have a deeply inhibiting effect upon the 
development of the latter, although the dependence studies have developed 
more fully the relationship between imported and local technology.
There is also a substantial degree of complementarity between the two 
analyses since the IIL very detailed case studies have carried the knowledge 
of learning beyond that reached by dependence analysts, and have point-
ed out a process of learning unknown in that literature – learning through 
exporting, which reverses the more usual view that learning is a condi-
tion to export [Westphal et al. (1980); Dahlman and Westphal (1982), for 
Korea]. Furthermore, the careful review by Bell (1982) of cases of learning 
has raised interesting hypotheses about the determinants of firm – behav-
ior and international differences in learning. His analysis of the behavior of 
firms in terms of pressures and inducements to developed local technolo-
gy converges with the analysis of the dependence studies. Moreover, his 
development of the "infant industry" argument (which space precludes 
discussing in the detail it deserves) has contributed to the analysis of the 
rationale and feasibility of science and technology policies in LDCs.
On the other hand, the analysis, at the sector level, of the dependence 
studies put more in focus the relationships between local technological efforts 
and the characteristics of demand and the patterns of competition, as well 
as the role played by specific State policies (e.g. the purchase policies of State 
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enterprises in the case of the capital goods industries). The sectorial approach 
also highlights the differences between sectors, pointing out the different 
role technology (local and imported) plays in the development of different 
industries and, conversely, the different role played by sectors in the techno-
logical development of the economy – a point to which we return in the next 
section. Within each sector, these studies show the interdependence of ac-
tions of the institutions involved foreign and national enterprises, government 
agencies and universities and research institutes, whereby, for instance, the 
entry of a foreign enterprises from commissioning studies to the detriment of 
local accumulation of the necessary experience.11 This interdependence may 
generate important synergistic effects intensifying the use of either local or 
imported technology (the latter being more frequent). Thus, the studies of 
dependence argue for a science and technology policy (explicit and implicit) 
which is disaggregated at the level of sectors but, at the same time, retains an 
integrated approach, encompassing all the relevant institutions involved in the 
technological development of the sector. It is possible that the limited success 
of the explicit science and technology policies of Latin-American countries 
to foster a substantially higher degree of technological self-reliance [Segasti 
(1978)] may be due not only to the contradictions between the explicit and 
implicit technology policies, already mentioned, but also to the way in which 
such policies were implemented, acting only at the enterprises level, without 
a sectorial approach. The case of the Brazilian computer industry studied in 
detail by Tigre (1982) is an exception, both in terms of success of technologi-
cal developments and in terms of a sectorial policy where implicit and explicit 
policies converge, which seems to confirm the rule.
Here we also find some agreement between the two groups of studies. 
For instance, they agree that the behavior of the firms has to be partly 
11 The same applies to purchase by State enterprises of capital goods and engineering services, 
where experience is a critical factor.
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explained in terms of the policies pursued by governments (not only the 
science and technology policy but also more general policy) and that gov-
ernment protection is necessary to support the "infant" local technological 
effort. Both IIL [especially Lall (1982a; 1982b)] and dependence analyses 
agree that such protection, to be effective, must go beyond technological 
activities and include the products which result from such activities. None-
theless, the dependence studies seem to have advanced more in this field 
of enterprises/sector/economy relationships, possibly because they were, 
at the outset, conceived as sectorial studies.
Therefore, combining the two groups of studies, perhaps we can be 
bolder than Dahlman and Westphal (1982, p. 115) when they assert that 
"as yet too few case studies exist for it to be possible to generalize about 
what determines the extent and the direction of technological effort by 
individual firms." 
Nonetheless, there are important differences between the two bodies 
of research, which stem from their respective original paradigms and their 
institutional insertion. Such as the treatment of government policies, but 
are crystallized in what, at first sight, seems to be simply a matter of em-
phasis: while the IIL research stresses the development of technological 
capability in LDCs, the dependence studies lean on the limited nature of 
such development. That this is not a simple question of relative emphasis 
becomes clear when we look at how the two groups interpret the phe-
nomenon in terms of the role played by LDCs in the international division 
of labor and their growth possibilities therein. 
A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER?
Dependence theory stressed, as we have shown, the trend to perpetuate 
the reliance on imported technology, as part and parcel of the peripher-
al condition of LDCs. Such imports, it was shown, involved high foreign 
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exchange costs, both in terms of explicit and hidden payment and in terms 
of export restrictions. Moreover, the pioneer study by Fajnzylber (1971) 
of Brazilian manufactured exports showed that the sectors which had a 
higher intensity of imported technology contributed little to the export of 
manufactures, while those sectors with higher than average exports did 
not import technology intensively. Thus, it concluded 
the majority of the industrial exports of the country rests upon the utilization of 
diffused technical knowledge. This supposes a fragile competitive position in a 
market, such as the one for manufactured products, characterized by the speed 
of innovations in products and processes (p. 196). 
Therefore, the dependence argument ran, the peripheral countries can-
not count on their spontaneous technological development to change their 
position in the international division of labor, where, by virtue of the tech-
nological dependence, their growth is partially limited. Furthermore, the dy-
namic of the international system and of their own economic and political 
structures are such that the peripheral condition of the LDCs is perpetuated.
What is probably the most original and provocative contribution of IIL 
studies is their suggestion that, contrary to the argument above, the tech-
nological development achieved by LDCs through minor innovations is an 
indicator of their dynamic comparative advantages and that a new interna-
tional division of labor is emerging, in which 
the comparative advantage of developed versus developing countries will be 
determined not so much by skill requirements in general, but by skill inputs 
based on specific learning processes which cannot be replicated in devel-
oping countries [Lall (1982b, p. 174, original emphasis)].
In this view, LDCs,
whose size, level of industrialization, education system and policy towards 
technology imports permit an independent assimilation of technology, should 
ESTRATÉGIAS DE DESENVOLVIMENTO, POLÍTICA INDUSTRIAL E INOVAÇÃO: 
ensaios em memória de Fabio Erber438
be able to gain a comparative advantage in various forms of high-skill activity 
where: (a) major innovations have been made abroad and are in the process 
of diffusion in advanced countries; (b) the necessary skills are acquired through 
engineering expertise gained through design and implementation of produc-
tion processes and capital goods, rather than through large-scale scientific 
activity on the frontiers of technology; (c) the activity is not aimed at meet-
ing changing needs of high-income, brand-conscious consumers; and (d) the 
technology involves large inputs of detailed design and adaptation to suit each 
application [Lall (1982b, p. 173)].
In such new international division of labor, the 
dividing line does not fall by industry but by particular technologies 
within each industry. This will lead to a change in the specializations of de-
veloped and developing countries: rather than concentrating on different types 
of industries as they tended to do till now, they will specialize in different pro-
cesses within the same industries. Developed-developing country trade will, in 
other words, come more and more to resemble inter-developed country trade 
(Ibid, p. 174, original emphasis).
Furthermore, LDCs "which have built up a strong technological capa-
bility will reveal different sorts of comparative advantages in their exports 
to other developing countries as opposed to more developed ones."While 
such LDCs will export to the latter countries complementary technology 
services and simpler engineering products than those locally produced, 
they would export to the other developing countries "older, simpler or 
smaller-scale equipment," as well as turnkey plants, consulting services 
and licensing (Ibid, p. 175). 
The evidence presented by the IIL studies on technology exports of 
LDCs12 indicate that the dependence school certainly under-rated the niches 
12 In a recent study of Brazilian exports of manufactured products and engineering services, Araujo Jr. 
et. al. (1983) have suggest that local firms and subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs) 
enjoy a competitive advantage in the markets of other LDCs based upon a learning process of rela-
tively stable technologies which they are able to adapt to the specific need of the LDCs' markets. 
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which the past expansion of world trade and growth opened up for the 
more industrialized LDCs, using their limited technological mastery; none-
theless, it is important to note that the IIL studies show that the mastery 
achieved was not simply the spontaneous result of market forces but was 
greatly aided by specific State policies.
Should we then draw the conclusions that those countries which have 
already reached such level of technological development should rest con-
tent with it? And should the other LDCs aim simply at achieving such levels 
of technological mastery and gear their policies simply to that purpose?
In essence, the IIL studies suggest a positive answer to such questions.13 
Thus, Dahlman and Westphal (1982, p. 129,130) argue that 
Korea’s experience further demonstrates that a high level of technological mas-
tery in all aspects of the uses of technological knowledge is not required for 
sustained industrial development [...] Korea has become a significant industrial 
power mainly as a result of its proficiency in production.
And Lall (1982b, p. 169), led by the formers’ results, makes a more gen-
eral suggestion that "it may be argued that for poor countries just em-
barking on industrial development the acquisition of know-how rather than 
investments in building up know why is the most appropriate policy."14
Notwithstanding the past successes of the newly industrialized coun-
tries (NICs) in technology exports, the answer provided by the IIL studies 
13 Although Bell (1982) is not concerned with export performance, the evidence he presents sug-
gests that for countries with a recent and small industrial sector the path of reaching the level 
of technological mastery achieved by the NICs is fraught with difficulties.
14 Dahlman and Westphal (1982) qualify this at the end by saying that “the objective acquiring 
technological mastery is not simply to produce in the present: it is equally to be able to 
adapt technology and to anticipate changes in world and domestic markets. Thus, it is also 
necessary to develop the capacity to innovate in various respects. It is unclear how far this 
capacity can be developed solely on the basic of production engineering or project execution 
experience" (p. 133). The evidence from dependence studies strongly argues that the answer 
to their query is negative.
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fall in a static trap, apparently led by their theoretical paradigm. In fact, 
the anti-Schumpeterian approach which characterizes the IIL view of tech-
nological development seems to lead them to disregard the cyclical nature 
of international economic development and to overlook the "primary" 
technological changes which are under way and which will deeply affect 
the international division of labor.
The rather optimistic picture the IIL studies drew of the future interna-
tional division of labor rests upon at least two important ceteris paribus 
clauses. First, that investment and world trade will continue to grow, pos-
sibly at even higher rates than they did in the post-war period, in order 
to create more niches to accommodate not only the present LDCs which 
export technology, but also the others which follow on their path. Second, 
that there is no major technical change which will erode the comparative 
advantage given by the technological development of LDCs.
Now, the two conditions outlined above are sharply contradicted 
by recent events. International trade and investment have plunged, as 
the world economy has got into a crisis which finds a parallel only with 
the thirties depression. In such cyclical downswing, the NICs which fol-
lowed an "outward-looking" development strategy have emerged as 
prime casualties as the "miracles" became horror stories. A Schumpe-
terian approach to development strategies could lead to the inclusion 
of consideration of a "cycle-elasticity of patterns of development" in 
recommendations of policies to LDCs. Thus, it may well be that a more 
inward-looking strategy, although it has the cost of profiting less of the 
expansionary phase of the cycle, may have the benefit of suffering less 
during the downswing. In this context of speculation, perhaps it would 
be useful to look again at the old thesis of Prebisch (1949) (formulated 
for the evolution of terms of trade) that, in the present international 
division of labor, the LDCs stand to lose more in the downswing 
of the cycle than they gain in the upswing.
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Although the way out of the present cycle is not in sight, it is clear that 
it will be associated with a deep change in the technical basis of the world 
economy, of which some aspects are already visible in the development of 
electronics and biotechnology.
Those two new technologies are, as is well known, based upon "large-
scale scientific activity on the frontiers of technology" and their activities are 
to a considerable extent (aimed at meeting changing needs of high-income, 
brand-conscious consumers, i.e. they are exactly the opposite activities in 
which, according to the IIL school, the LDCs have comparative advantages. 
The resources used for innovation in these industries are highly concentrated 
in the advanced countries and the theory and experience of diffusion of inno-
vations strongly suggest that the rate of diffusion of such innovations will be 
much faster in the centre than in the periphery, widening their gap; not only 
in research and development (R&D) but also in manufacturing technology.
Moreover, the diffusion of electronics will affect many of the activities in 
which the NICs could have comparative advantages as regards both more 
and LDCs than them. This applies, for instance for the simpler (non-elec-
tronic) machine-tools and the labor-intensive detailed design services they 
would sell to the advanced countries [Lall (1982a)], which are likely to 
be replaced by numerically-controlled machine tools and computer-aided 
design,15 produced more efficiently in the central countries. The latter may 
also prove to be strong competitors in the markets of the LDCs (markets 
not to be overlooked in the present crisis), since electronics will reduce 
the costs of adaptation of designs and of scaling-down of processes and 
equipment to suit the specific need of such countries.16
15 For evidence on the gap of diffusion of electronic-based capital goods between central and 
peripheral economies, see, among others, UNCTAD (1982) and Tauile (1983). For comput-
er-aided design, see Kaplinsky (1982). The latter’s conclusion on the role played by electronics 
in widening the gap between DCs and LDCs is the same as ours.
16 As it is well known, one of the main features of the electronic innovations is that they break 
the link between automation and large-scale production, allowing for the automation of 
batch production.
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Another cycle-related factor which may reduce the technology exports 
of LDCs is their capacity to finance them. Although the IIL studies tend 
to overlook the role played by finance, to concentrate on technology, it 
is well known that in such markets the former plays a role at least as im-
portant as the latter. The present balance of payment problems faced by 
countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Korea will probably under-
mine further their technology export capability by reducing their capacity 
to finance such exports in conditions similar to those provided by the more 
advanced countries.
Finally, the present phase of the cycle may lead to reduction of the 
technological capability of the LDCs, not only in relative terms (the wid-
ening gap argument outlined above), but also in absolute terms, by two 
mechanisms. The first is the closure of local firms, unable to resist the 
international crisis and the restrictive policies local governments have put 
in practice to control inflation and balance the external account (at least in 
Latin America). The sectors producing the goods and services composing 
the technology exports are likely to be especially affected, given the role 
of the demand from local public enterprises for their survival. The drastic 
cut-down in public investment in such countries finds no compensation 
from increased exports, since protectionist and/or contractions policies are 
spreading, with feedback effects.17 In fact, Cruz, one of Katz collaborators, 
has repeatedly warned that, the closured of such enterprises means the 
liquidation of a technical capability which will take long to reconstruct, 
even when the new upswing comes [Cruz (1982)].
The second mechanism is the shift of manufacturing from LDCs to 
the central countries by multinational companies. Stimulated by the new 
17 For instance, one of the leading manufacturers of machine tools in Brazil recently went into re-
ceivership when their Mexican market closed. The reduction of investment of OPEC countries 
will also reduce the markets for the LDCs technology exports.
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possibilities of automation opened up by electronics and by an increased 
weight attached to product-quality in competition, this seems to be al-
ready happening in electronics semiconductor production [Rada (1982)]. 
Kaplinsky’s contribution to this volume explores this phenomenon in some 
more detail, suggesting that the new technologies abode bad for the man-
ufacturing technology capability of the LDC.
Thus, the present phase of the cycle does not seem to support the 
optimism and the policy implications of the IIL authors. By way of final-
izing, we can point to another similarity between them and dependence 
authors: if the latter suffered from not assessing properly the opportunities 
opened up by the boom phase of the cycle, the former did not seem to 
have fully appreciated the implications of the present decline phase. All in 
all, old Schumpeter (and Marx) may still have a lot to teach all of us.
A FINAL NOTE
Economists seem to hold a peculiar relationship to technology. Hav-
ing recently discovered they had neglected the theme since the days of 
Schumpeter, the profession now seems to display symptoms of serious 
guilt-inspired behavior – on the one hand, it proclaims the overriding im-
portance of technology, on the other, they beat the breast about their 
ignorance on the subject. Such ritual is rendered easier by disregarding the 
work done outside one’s own parochy.
The two bodies of literature discussed in this article argue against the 
behavior described above. They show that over the past decade and a half 
we have accumulated a substantial body of knowledge about an import-
ant phenomenon in the process of technological development in LDCs and 
how it relates to the technological development in DCs. Moreover, we have 
also advanced our knowledge about the relationship between technological 
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development and other features of the development of the LDCs (e.g. indus-
trial structure, role of foreign capital, the roles played by the State and so on).
The preceding sections also argue against technological "naïve opti-
mism." No matter how important technology is – and we have argued it 
is important –, it cannot by itself change the pattern of development of 
LDCs or the international division of labor. Not there are grounds to be-
lieve that technological development necessarily leads to general progress 
and greater equality. Contrary to the Victorian hopes we still entertain, 
technological development may be associated to "perverse" patterns of 
development – one more reason to study it and try to orient it.
However, we should also avoid the pitfalls of narcissism. Our areas 
of ignorance in this field (as in so many more of development) are vast, 
as shown, for example, by the difficulty of explaining the phenomenon 
of non-learning. Therefore the tradition of pleading for further research 
deserves to be honored once more. To finalize, this article enters a further 
plea – for more communication between researchers working on similar 
subjects. It doesn’t cost much and it may help a lot.
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